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In the last decade, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas 
de Caritat Marquis de Condorcet’s (1785) theory 
of committee decision making has emerged as 
a workhorse model in political economy, par-
ticularly voting theory. In its simplest modern 
formulation, the “Condorcet Jury Model” (CJM 
hereafter) features a committee of size n that is 
faced with a binary policy. The optimal policy 
is the same for all members, but depends on an 
unknown state of the world. Each member of the 
committee receives some private information 
about the state. The policy is determined by an 
election in which each voter can vote for either 
alternative, and the profile of votes is aggregated 
into a group decision according to some voting 
rule such as majority or unanimity with a sta-
tus quo. The voting procedure also specifies the 
order in which voters cast their votes.
In this framework, one can compare voting 
behavior and informational efficiency under 
alternative voting rules and procedures, a meth-
odology referred to as the information aggre-
gation approach to elections. The past decade 
has produced a large and growing set of results 
on this topic, under various modifications to 
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the basic CJM.1 This resurgence of interest in 
Condorcet’s approach was sparked by a key 
observation of David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey 
Banks (1996) that “naive” voting is generally 
not a Nash equilibrium of the voting game. 
That is, the optimal way to vote in a multiper-
son committee is not usually the same as the 
optimal way to vote in a committee of one, an 
issue overlooked by Condorcet and other non-
game-theoretic analyses of his model. In fact, 
a voter’s strategic incentives generally depend 
on all the variables of the model: the size of the 
committee, the voting rule and procedure, the 
information structure, preferences, and so forth. 
Because such a simple model offers rich insights 
into the strategic considerations faced by voters, 
the CJM has played a prominent role in enhanc-
ing our understanding of voting mechanisms.
However, some of the equilibrium properties 
of these common value elections can be unin-
tuitive. In a striking example of this, Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer (1998, FP hereafter) have 
shown that in the context of juries for criminal 
trials, requiring a unanimous vote for convic-
tion may actually lead to more convictions than 
using majority rule. Because such theoretical 
predictions and the equilibrium strategies that 
underlie them are seemingly unnatural, they 
are particularly good candidates for empirical 
testing. Unfortunately, testing the theory with 
field data is virtually impossible because of the 
sensitivity of the results to the exact parameters 
of the model, and there are no obvious datasets 
available for such a purpose. Consequently, in 
1 In addition to the other references in our introduction, 
see Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (1996, 
1997), Andrew McLennan (1998), Roger Myerson (1998), 
Michael Chwe (1999), Peter Coughlan (000), Arnaud 
Costinot and Kartik (007), and Dino Gerardi and Leeat 
Yariv (007), among others.
 The closest would be some data on real jury voting, 
but the details of the information structure are not clear, 
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this paper, we adopt an experimental approach 
to understanding common value elections.
This paper examines two interrelated issues 
in the information aggregation approach to vot-
ing. The first question that we address is robust-
ness. Since the goal of the theory is to provide 
a general framework to analyze voting in com-
mittees, is it the case that committees that are 
fundamentally different respond in similar ways 
to their asymmetric information? We address 
this question by comparing decision making 
under unanimity rule in ad hoc committees, 
like juries or expert panels, versus standing 
committees, like boards of directors, judicial 
panels, or town councils. An important differ-
ence between the two is that ad hoc committees 
have a short life and address a very limited set of 
issues (often only one, as with trial juries in the 
United States), whereas standing committees 
have a long life, and the members of the panel 
therefore engage in a repeated game. Hence, our 
first question is: do the theoretical predictions of 
the CJM apply equally well (or equally poorly) 
to the behavior of ad hoc committees and to the 
behavior of standing committees?
One reason to believe that there could be a 
difference is that the CJM usually has many 
equilibria. Broadly speaking, a common value 
election involves coordination among voters, 
and thus admits multiple equilibria which can be 
ranked by the Pareto criterion. Moreover, when 
committee members vote sequentially, there are 
asymmetries across voting positions that may be 
relevant to behavior. Indeed, it has often been 
suggested that sequential voting would give rise 
to momentum effects, where later voters tend to 
follow the choices of earlier voters. Recent the-
oretical work on this question by Eddie Dekel 
and Michele Piccione (000) and Ali and Kartik 
(007) has demonstrated that strategic voting in 
sequential elections can be both history-inde-
pendent and history-dependent.3 This leads to 
the second question: can the timing structure of 
the voting procedure lead to selection of differ-
ent equilibria?
and neither is the actual voting procedure used (since juries 
operate behind closed doors).
3 The aforementioned authors prove results for a wide 
class of voting rules, including unanimity rule, which is our 
focus here. In the context of majority rule, see also Jörgen 
Wit (1997), Mark Fey (000), and Steven Callander (007).
There have been only a few prior experimen-
tal studies of voting behavior in the CJM.4 The 
most relevant for us is the first study of stra-
tegic voting under unanimity rule, by Serena 
Guarnaschelli, Richard D. McKelvey, and 
Palfrey (000, GMP hereafter). They found that, 
consistent with equilibrium predictions, com-
mittee members often voted strategically in the 
sense of sometimes casting a vote in contradic-
tion to their private information about the state 
of the world. GMP also found that the compara-
tive static predictions about the voter strategies 
under unanimity rule were qualitatively correct 
(more strategic voting in larger committees), 
although the changes in observed behavior were 
not as large as predicted by theory. An impor-
tant consequence of this deviation from equilib-
rium strategies was that many of the predictions 
of FP with respect to information aggregation 
and efficiency were rejected by the data.
The GMP study considered only ad hoc com-
mittees that met once and then were dissolved. 
In the study reported here, we attempt to repli-
cate their results with standing committees that 
meet repeatedly. Moreover, GMP considered 
only simultaneous voting. Here, we compare 
behavior under sequential and simultaneous 
voting procedures.
I.  Experimental Design and Procedures
The laboratory study implemented several 
variations of the following game based on the 
CJM. There is a committee (e.g., a jury) with 
n members. Nature randomly chooses a payoff-
relevant state of the world, v,  from the set V 
5 5G, I6, where “G” stands for Guilty and “I” 
for Innocent. Each state is chosen with equal 
probability. Members do not observe the selec-
tion of the state, but each member, j, receives a 
private signal, sj , about the state. Each signal sj 
[ 5g, i6 is a conditionally independent Bernoulli 
random variable where Pr 1sj 5 gZv 5 G 2 5 
Pr 1sj 5 i Zv 5 I 2 5 p . 1/2. Each member j casts 
a vote vj [ 5c, a 6 for one of two outcomes in X 
5 5C, A6, where “C” stands for Convict and “A” 
for Acquit. There is no abstention. All the com-
mittees reported in this study operated under 
unanimity rule, which requires all n members to 
cast a c vote in order for C to be the committee 
4 See Angela Hung and Charles R. Plott (001), Krishna 
Ladha, Gary Miller, and Joe Oppenheimer (003), and 
Goeree and Yariv (007).
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decision. Members have identical preferences, 
which depend only on the group decision and 
the state of the world: u 1C, G2 5 u 1A, I 2 5 1, and 
u 1C, I 2 5 u 1A, G2 5 0.
Our experimental design has three treatment 
variables: committee size 1n 2 , committee type 
(ad hoc or standing), and voting procedure. We 
consider committees of two different sizes, n 
5 3 and n 5 6, and two different voting pro-
cedures: simultaneous voting and sequential 
voting. Simultaneous voting is like a secret 
ballot, where individuals vote after receiving 
their private signals, but observing nothing 
else. In the sequential voting procedure, mem-
bers vote one by one in a prespecified sequence, 
with each voter observing the votes (but not the 
private signals) of those before them. In the ad 
hoc committee treatment, subjects were ran-
domly rematched into groups of size n at the 
start of each period. In contrast, in the standing 
committee treatment, subjects were randomly 
grouped at the start of the experiment, but the 
group composition remained constant during 
the entire experiment.
While our procedures are standard in experi-
mental economics, there were several differences 
across treatments, including the subject pool, 
instructions, software, payoff salience, etc. The 
simultaneous ad hoc committee data are from 
the GMP study. The sessions for that study were 
conducted in 1997 and used 48 Caltech subjects 
who participated in 15 committees with unanim-
ity rule.5 These sessions used a software program 
written in C11. The sequential ad hoc commit-
tee data were collected at UCLA in 007, and 
in these experiments each subject participated in 
30 committees. These sessions were conducted 
using the JAVA-based Multistage program 
(http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu) and verbal 
instructions including overhead slides. Finally, 
the standing committee data were collected at 
UCLA in 003, using a Virtual Basic program 
and online instructions.6 In these experiments, 
subjects made 30 committee decisions.7 The 
5 Each of these subjects also participated in additional 
committees with different voting rules and procedures, data 
that we do not use in this paper. See Serena Guarnaschelli, 
Richard D. McKelvey, and Palfrey (000) for details.
6 We would like to thank Jos Theelen for programming 
the standing committee experiments.
7 In the UCLA experiments, subjects were recruited 
by mass e-mail invitations to registered members of a 
large subject pool of UCLA students, maintained by the 
California Social Science Experimental Laboratory.
three programs differed somewhat in the user 
interface for entering decisions. As we will 
show below, the experimental results seem to be 
quite robust to these variations in protocols and 
procedures.
In total,  subjects participated in the exper-
iments (this includes the GMP subjects). Average 
earnings in the UCLA experiments were $3.7, 
plus a fixed show-up payment; the experiments 
lasted somewhere between 40 and 60 minutes.8
II.  Results
We focus our discussion of the experimental 
results mainly on the differences between ad hoc 
and standing committees, dividing the presenta-
tion between simultaneous and sequential vot-
ing. While we compare and contrast the behavior 
in different treatments, we do not explicitly test 
whether differences in behavior are statisti-
cally significant, because observations of group 
behavior are potentially correlated across rounds. 
Instead, the focus is on qualitative/economically 
substantive differences. We discuss this issue 
further in the final section of the paper.
A. Simultaneous Voting Procedure
First we ask: is behavior different between ad 
hoc committees and standing committees oper-
ating under unanimity rule with simultaneous 
voting? The top part of Table 1 answers that ques-
tion with a clear no in terms of aggregate behav-
ior. It reports the fraction of observations where 
individuals voted to convict in each treatment, 
broken down by whether they had received an 
innocent or guilty signal. The number of obser-
vations is shown in parentheses. The last two 
rows of Table 1 show the predicted frequencies 
of the unique responsive symmetric equilibrium, 
in which voters with guilty signals always vote 
to convict, and voters with innocent signals vote 
to convict with probability s* 1n 2 [ 10, 12 .9 There 
is essentially no difference between ad hoc and 
8 In the UCLA sessions, subjects earned $1.00 for each 
correct committee decision and $0.10 for each incorrect 
committee decision. In the GMP experiment, subjects 
earned $0.50 for each correct decision and $0.05 for each 
incorrect decision.
9 “Responsive” means that a voter’s behavior is not inde-
pendent of his signal. The GMP study used slightly more 
informative signals (0.70 compared to 0.67). This results in 
negligible differences in the equilibrium, s* 1n 2 , as seen in 
the bottom two rows of Table 1.
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standing committees in the probability of voting 
to convict with either a guilty or innocent sig-
nal when n 5 3, and only a negligible difference 
when n 5 6. We conclude that the findings of 
GMP are replicated almost exactly using stand-
ing committees instead of ad hoc committees 
(and all the other procedural differences). Note 
that there is clear evidence of at least some stra-
tegic voting: regardless of treatment, a signifi-
cant fraction of subjects votes to convict with an 
innocent signal. In the n 5 3 cases, the fraction 
is a bit higher than equilibrium predicts, whereas 
in n 5 6, it is lower. In both ad hoc and standing 
committees, the predicted comparative static, 
that s* 1n 2 increases with n, is observed.
Second we ask: is information aggregation 
different in ad hoc committees and standing 
committees? Because standing committees 
allow greater opportunities for coordination, 
one may conjecture that such committees will 
aggregate information more efficiently than ad 
hoc committees. The top part of Table  shows 
the proportion of correct group decisions (con-
victing the guilty or acquitting the innocent). 
On the whole, we see, at best, limited support 
for this conjecture. In particular, there is vir-
tually no difference in information aggrega-
tion between ad hoc and standing committees 
when n 5 6. When n 5 3, ad hoc committees do 
 better than standing committees in the G state, 
and worse in the I state: overall, the fraction of 
correct decisions in the ad hoc committees is 57 
percent, whereas it is 64 percent for standing 
committees. These numbers can be compared 
with the predictions of the symmetric equi-
librium and an efficient equilibrium, i.e., the 
one that maximizes the committee’s welfare, 
shown in the bottom two rows in Table . The 
 efficient equilibrium highlighted in Table  is an 
asymmetric equilibrium where two voters vote 
informatively (i.e., “vote their signal” ), and all 
remaining voters convict regardless of signal.10
B. Sequential Voting Procedure
We now turn to our sequential voting treatments, 
where votes are cast publicly one after another. 
First we ask: is behavior different between ad 
hoc committees and standing committees operat-
ing under unanimity rule with sequential voting? 
To address this question, we examine only those 
observations in which a voter does not already 
know the outcome of the election, i.e. every pre-
ceding voter has voted to convict so far. This is 
appropriate because once a voter votes to acquit, 
each subsequent voter is indifferent between vot-
ing to convict and voting to acquit.
The bottom part of Table 1 lists the aggregate 
frequencies with which subjects vote to convict 
given each signal for such undecided histories. 
This can be compared with the symmetric, his-
tory-independent equilibrium of the sequential 
voting game (bottom row), which simply repli-
cates the symmetric equilibrium of the simulta-
neous game, an insight due to Dekel and Piccione 
(000). The only substantial difference across 
committee types is in the six-person treatments 
10  For our parameters, an alternative equilibrium in 
which one voter votes informatively and all remaining 
 voters vote to convict attains the same expected payoffs 
as the efficient equilibrium we describe in Table . In this 
alternative equilibrium, convictions in the guilty state 
occur with the same probability as acquittals in the inno-
cent state, a feature not shared by our experimental data in 
any treatment.
Table 1—Frequency of Votes to Convict by Signal 1Number of observations in parentheses 2
Committee size 5 3 Committee size 5 6
Guilty signal 1s 5 g 2 Innocent signal 1s 5 i 2 Guilty signal 1s 5 g 2 Innocent signals 1s 5 i 2
Simultaneous voting
 Ad hoc committee 0.95 11742 0.36 11862 0.90 11862 0.48 11862
 Standing committee 0.94 13382 0.35 1382 0.94 14642 0.5 16162
Sequential voting
 Ad hoc committee 0.97 1312 0.39 1002 0.93 13172 0.6 1862
 Standing committee 0.98 102 0.44 1192 0.98 1872 0.50 162
Symmetric equilibrium
 p 5 0.7 1 0.31 1 0.65
 p 5 0.67 1 0.3 1 0.66
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under innocent signals. In this case, subjects in 
standing committees convict significantly less 
than in ad hoc committees. In the remaining 
three cases, there are only small differences 1n 
5 3, s 5 i and n 5 6, s 5 g 2 or virtually none 1n 
5 3, s 5 g 2 . Overall, at this aggregate level, the 
behavior of ad hoc committees is closer to the 
predictions of the symmetric equilibrium.
Second we ask: is information aggregation 
different in ad hoc committees and standing 
committees? Here, we do find some support for 
the conjecture that standing committees would 
aggregate information more efficiently than ad 
hoc committees, although only for the smaller 
committee size (see Table ). For the six-person 
committees, there are only slight differences in 
the probability of making the right decision con-
ditional on each state. For the three-person case, 
standing committees appear to do significantly 
better than ad hoc committees in the G state, but 
do approximately well in the I state: overall, the 
fraction of correct decisions in the ad hoc com-
mittees is 5 percent, whereas it is 63 percent 
for standing committees. Again, these aggregate 
percentages can be compared with the predic-
tions of the symmetric and efficient equilibrium 
that are listed in the bottom two rows of Table .
III.  Discussion
A remarkable feature of our data is the consis-
tency or robustness across treatments. Recall that 
the data were collected at various points in time, 
using different subject pools, software, instruc-
tions, etc., and by different experimenters. Yet 
many features of the data, e.g., the tendency to 
vote strategically after having received an inno-
cent signal, are similar across treatments, both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms. Furthermore, 
we find only minor differences between ad 
hoc and standing committees, suggesting that 
repeated interactions do not necessarily lead to 
the selection of different equilibria.
While it is desirable to test whether the differ-
ences across treatments are statistically signifi-
cant, a challenge is that observations of group 
decisions are not independent across rounds. To 
illustrate: in the standing committee decisions, 
the past behavior by members of a group may 
influence a subject’s future behavior, thereby 
making the group’s decisions across rounds 
correlated. While the question of significance 
is important, and one that we hope to address 
rigorously in future work, the similarity of both 
behavior and aggregate outcomes across ad hoc 
and standing treatments is striking.
Interestingly, there are some differences 
between the simultaneous and sequential treat-
ments that suggest the possibility of informa-
tion cascades or momentum effects under the 
sequential voting procedure. Consider, for 
instance, the fraction of correct outcomes for 
a committee of size six (see the right-most two 
columns of Table ). Note that sequential vot-
ing results in a higher percentage of convictions 
in both the innocent and guilty states, possi-
bly because later voters with innocent signals 
mimicked predecessors who voted to convict. 
Indeed, although we do not report it here, the 
data show that this is often the case.
In future work, we plan to analyze how vot-
ing strategies vary with the voter’s position 
Table —Correct Decisions by State 1Number of observations in parentheses 2
Committee size 5 3 Committee size 5 6
Convicting guilty Acquitting innocent Convicting guilty Acquitting innocent
Simultaneous voting
 Ad hoc committee 0.47 1572 0.81 1632 0.7 162 0.97 1342
 Standing committee 0.39 1132 0.94 11082 0.7 1832 0.99 1972
Sequential voting
 Ad hoc committee 0.35 11672 0.79 11062 0.38 1102 0.87 11502
 Standing committee 0.50 11132 0.78 1972 0.33 11012 0.87 1792
Symmetric equilibrium
 p 5 0.7 0.50 0.86 0.5 0.81
 p 5 0.67 0.46 0.84 0.48 0.79
Efficient equilibrium
 p 5 0.7 0.49 0.91 0.49 0.91
 p 5 0.67 0.44 0.89 0.44 0.89
MAY 2008186 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
under the sequential protocol. In particular, we 
will compare the history-independent symmet-
ric equilibrium (Dekel and Piccione 000) with 
the history-dependent posterior based voting 
(PBV) equilibrium proposed by Ali and Kartik 
(007).11 Obviously, in the data there are some 
deviations that cannot be described by either 
equilibrium, and we will employ a logit-QRE 
framework to allow for a maximum likelihood 
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